Ankara’s strong stance on the Syria conflict helped bolster its status as a rising leader in the region. But its approach to the coup in Egypt could undo that.
By Ilhan Tanir
In early 2012, I visited Damascus and its suburbs and stayed there for two weeks. I met with Syrians of diverse professions, from shoe repairmen and teachers, to college students. I interviewed half a dozen commanders of the then-nascent Free Syrian Army local battalions, who sometimes hosted me at their family homes.
Neither civilians nor FSA members had any difficulty explaining why they rose up against the Assad regime: They wanted freedom, equal economic opportunity and dignity. Most if not all of these earlier members of the uprising were crushed in later months of the conflict as the military aid promised by the West, particularly the U.S., never materialized.
During my visits to Aleppo and Idlib later in 2012, I also heard the same crystal clear demands by Syrians in their “liberated’ cities, though the radical Islamist battalions were creeping up and foreign fighters were flowing into the country at an accelerated pace.
Turkey’s strong pro-revolution Syria policy, within this context, earned much respect from many circles within and outside of Turkey. But the Assad regime proved to be more resilient by 2013. Radical jihadists boosted their presence in Syria and intra-rebel fighting began, and Turkey’s support for the Syrian rebels began backfiring. In contrast with the crucial Russian and Iranian economic and military aid to the Assad regime, the West never provided serious military aid of the kind that could change the balance of power in favor of the opposition forces. In addition, the Syrian opposition leaders proved to be ineffective, unable to overcome the differences among them for the sake of a united Syria.
Turkey’s policy in Egypt against the coup also seemed to be principled at first, for its strong condemnation of the Egyptian military. However, the AKP government did not stop there. Erdogan went so far as to condemn countries in the West and East for not taking a firm stand against the Egyptian interim government. Erdogan accused many of his allies of being complicit with Egypt’s coup makers and of betraying the notion of democracy.
While Turkey cemented its unity with many of its traditional allies against Assad in Syria, Ankara alienated most of the countries in the same category with its scolding posture against the coup in Egypt. For instance, although Turkey has frequently disagreed over strategies or tactics, it has been always on the same page with the U.S., NATO, EU countries and the Gulf states with regards to Assad. But Turkey’s Egypt policy strained relations with most of the allies, particularly with the Gulf countries, who have given largely blank checks to Egypt’s interim government.
For two years, Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan challenged Assad and many times threatened to intervene in the Syria conflict. Ankara’s harsh rhetoric received much attention in the world media due to its proximity, the size of its military, and its newly acquired status as a leader in the country. But in the end, much of Erdogan’s rhetoric has proven to be a bluff. Erdogan couldn’t topple the Assad regime, its deterrence posture dealt a blow in a place where playing hardball is crucial.
Nevertheless, Turkey did help both the armed and unarmed Syrian opposition at a high level. Turkey’s camps for the Syrian refugees earned much praise. Hundreds of Syrians received scholarships to attend Turkish universities and in many other ways the government in Ankara aided the Syrian refugees to lighten their burden.
On Egypt’s coup leader el Sisi, Erdogan’s recent remarks now sound dangerously close to those he used regarding Assad. On August 17, Erdogan said, “there is not much difference between Assad and el Sisi,” and he accused the Egyptian military of conducting “bloodthirsty” massacres. On August 20, Erdogan called on “faithful members of the Egyptian military” not to shoot at their Muslim brothers. However, even though Erdogan fervently nettles the Egypt’s Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) almost every day, since Turkey doesn’t have any allies on the same page and certainly does not hold sway over the Egyptian military or economic affairs, Erdogan’s words ring hollow. World capitals and global media know well that there is little that Mr. Erdogan can do to shape events in Egypt.
While Ankara was taking a lead during “friends of Syria” conferences or coordinating with many of the Western states to tighten the noose around the Assad regime through sanctions, it was pursuing a moral Syrian policy as well as realist one by moving in step with the international community. In Egypt though, Ankara’s foreign policy may be idealist but it is a very isolated one, one that damages its relations with just about all regional capitals.
Erdogan’s top foreign policy adviser, Mr. Ibrahim Kalin, recently sort of accepted this isolation, judging by a tweet in which he called this state of affairs “precious loneliness.” Only a year ago, top AKP officials were giving speeches about how Turkey is destined to be a regional leader.
The worst part is that recent remarks coming out of Ankara appear to be even more invested in policies based on a black and white view of the world, which will make it even harder for Turkey to break from those policies any time soon.
All indications suggest that the AKP administration prefers to live in these parallel worlds, creating its own global narrative for its domestic audience while its alliances collapse. It remains to be seen if whether Erdogan will learn he had better change course.
Ilhan Tanir is the Washington, DC correspondent for Vatan Daily, and the Posta212 Weekly. He is a Turkey analyst, writes and comments extensively on Turkey-U.S. relations, Syria, as well as issues related to the wider Middle East and Eurasian region. His Twitter handle is @WashingtonPoint
A version of this piece appeared in Turkish in Posta212.
